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Abstract
We study steady state optimal taxation in a context where ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity and
they decide whether to produce or not after comparing after-tax proﬁts vis-` a-vis an outside
alternative option. The government taxes capital income, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and labor income but
does not tax the alternative outside option. In this context, taxation might distort the ﬁrms’
decisions to participate in production (extensive margin) as well as their factor allocations once
they decide to produce (intensive margin). We ﬁnd that the government has incentives to
subsidize costs to induce ﬁrms into production and tax them using the corporate tax to collect
revenues. The optimal capital income tax is negative while the corporate tax rate is positive
and the labor income tax is ambiguous.
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In this paper we study steady state optimal (Ramsey) taxation in a context where ﬁrms are het-
erogeneous in the sense that they diﬀer in their productivity and decide whether to enter into
production or not. This decision is taken after comparing the after-tax proﬁts obtained from pro-
duction vis-` a-vis an outside alternative option. The government ﬁnances an exogenous expenditure
path using three tax instruments: capital income tax, labor income tax and a tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Also, the government can issue debt to ﬁnance its expenditure but, crucially, we assume that the
yields of the alternative option cannot be taxed. So, our context is one of incomplete taxation,
where it is not possible to tax all sources of income.
In this context, taxation potentially distorts the ﬁrms’ decision to participate in production,
i.e. the extensive margin distortion, as well as the factor allocations of the ﬁrms already involved
in production, i.e. the intensive margin distortion. The optimal combination of tax instruments
depends on these distortions. We show that when all ﬁrms are involved in production it is optimal
to set capital income as well as labor income taxes equal to zero and raise taxes only through the tax
on proﬁts. In this case, the tax on proﬁts does not aﬀect either the extensive or the intensive margin,
while the other taxes would distort the intensive margin. Consequently, the solution requires to set
capital income tax equal to zero, as in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) celebrated result, and the
tax on labor also equal to zero.
However, when there are ﬁrms that decide not to produce, the tax on proﬁts distorts the
extensive margin. In this case it is optimal to set a negative capital income tax. By subsidizing
capital the social planner induces ﬁrms that are in the margin to enter into production and then
taxes their proﬁts. A similar intuition is obtained for labor income taxes, but the sign of this tax
depends also on labor supply considerations.
In other words, the planner subsidizes costs in an eﬀort to complete the tax system. Since
the government cannot tax the outside option, subsidizing costs induce some ﬁrms into production
and make them taxable. If all ﬁrms were already involved in production, it would be pointless to
subsidize ﬁrms.
To make our point, we also consider the case where the outside option is taxable at the same
rate as proﬁts. In this case, the optimal capital and labor income would be zero because it is not
necessary to create incentives for ﬁrms to participate in production to tax them since the outside
1option is already taxable. In this case, taxing proﬁts would not distort any margin and it is optimal
to set the other taxes equal to zero.
The paper is related to several other studies in the literature. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
ﬁnd that the optimal capital income taxation is equal to zero in steady state in a competitive
environment. After these studies, several papers showed that optimal capital income taxation is
diﬀerent from zero if the context is modiﬁed in some ways.
Correia (1996) extends Chamley (1986)’s result to the case where not all factors can be taxed,
that is to an environment of incomplete taxation. She ﬁnds that taxing capital would be an indirect
way of taxing the untaxed factor and the sign of this tax would depend on the complementarity
between capital and the untaxed factor.1 As Correia (1996)’s, our context is one of incomplete
taxation since the government does not tax the alternative option but diﬀers in that we analyze
an environment where ﬁrms are heterogeneous. Firm heterogeneity and the distortions created in
the extensive margin are key to our results. In our case, the planner has incentives to subsidize
costs making possible the taxation of ﬁrms that would not otherwise be taxed. Thus, the optimal
capital income taxation is negative.
In the same vein as Correia (1996), other studies ﬁnd that capital taxes should not be zero as
a consequence of incomplete taxation. Jones et al (1993) studied the issue in endogenous growth
models showing that including government expenditures as a productive input leads to an optimal
tax rate diﬀerent from zero. The reason is similar to Correia’s explanation since government
expenditure is not taxed. Jones et al (1997) also show that the zero income capital tax does no
longer hold when there are pure proﬁts generated. Their interpretation of this result is that taxing
capital is a way of taxing pure proﬁts in a setting where they cannot be taxed directly.
A second line of research related to our study are Judd (1997), Judd (2002) and Coto-Martinez
et al (2007). Judd (1997) and Judd (2002) use a context of monopolistic competition and argue that
the optimal capital income tax rate is negative and the tax on proﬁts is positive. Coto-Martinez
et al (2007) add entry and exit of ﬁrms to the context of Judd’s works where the entrance of new
ﬁrms augment the general productivity of the economy but imply a waste of resources in the form
of a ﬁxed cost. Judd ﬁnds that the optimal capital income taxation is negative and the tax on
proﬁts is positive. In Coto-Martinez et al (2007) optimal taxes depend on the tax code available.
1Correia (1996) suggests that similar results would be obtained if ﬁrms present decreasing returns to scale and
proﬁts cannot be taxed.
2When the available taxes are such that the government can control the number of ﬁrms through
a tax on proﬁts, it is optimal to subsidize capital to correct the markup distortion as in Judd and
set a subsidy or a tax on proﬁts depending on the aggregate returns to specialization. When the
tax system does not allow to control the number of ﬁrms through proﬁts taxation, they ﬁnd that
the optimal capital income taxation is zero if the returns to specialization are zero. The reason
is that, in this case, it is not desirable to subsidize the entrance of new ﬁrms since there are only
losses (ﬁxed cost) associated with them.
We also ﬁnd that it is optimal to subsidize capital but in a context of perfect competition (no
markup distortions) and without aggregate returns to specialization. Our results also depend on
the availability of taxes. In the general case, where the yields of the alternative option cannot be
taxed, it is optimal to subsidize capital, and possibly labor, to induce ﬁrms that are in the margin
into production making possible their taxation. As mentioned above if the alternative option could
be taxed at the same rate as proﬁts the labor and capital taxes are zero. Thus, in our case, the
subsidy to capital is an eﬀort of the planner to complete the tax system and not the result of
distortions created by imperfect competition or the presence of returns to specialization. In this
sense it is related to the work of Correia and others mentioned above. In the general case, our
context is one of incomplete taxation and the planner has incentives to partially complete them via
subsidies.
To the best of our knowledge, the papers most related to ours are the mentioned above. However,
there are other papers that ﬁnd an optimal capital income tax diﬀerent from zero. Aiyagari (1995)
made the point in an economy with borrowing constraints. The reason is that, in these economies,
precautionary savings leads to too much capital in steady state. The optimality of taxing capital
income was also obtained in OLG models. Recent works using this approach includes Abel (2005)
and Erosa and Gervais (2002). Abel (2005) focuses on a context with consumption externalities
between generations and shows that taxing capital is a way to correct the no “internalization” of
cohorts’ consumption. Erosa and Gervais (2002) derives the optimality of capital taxation as a way
of making taxes age-dependant. In a context of private information about agents skills, Golosov et
al (2003) show that it is optimal to have a wedge between the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost
of investing, which is consistent with a positive tax in capital income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 sets up the
3Ramsey problem; subsection 3.1 analyzes capital income taxation, subsection 3.2 sets the optimal
labor income and proﬁts tax and subsection 3.3 study the case when the yields of the alternative
option is taxable. Section 4 presents numerical examples that conﬁrms our theoretical ﬁndings and




There is a set I of mass one of heterogeneous ﬁrms indexed by i that could operate and produce a
single good. Firm heterogeneity comes from a productivity parameter, Ait, which is iid across time
t and is distributed across ﬁrms with cumulative distribution G(Ait) with support [Al,Au], where
0 < Al < Au < ∞. Let kit and lit be capital and labor used by ﬁrm i in the production process in
period t.
Capital is rented from the representative household each period at the rental rate rt, which, in
equilibrium, is the same for all ﬁrms. Firms pay an amount wt as compensation for the use of labor,
which is also common to all ﬁrms in equilibrium. Both, rt and wt are expressed in terms of the
consumption good. Each ﬁrm production function presents decreasing returns to scale and is given
by Aitf(kit,lit), where f(kit,lit) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfy Inada conditions
on kit and lit. We further assume that f(kit,lit) is homogeneous of degree θ < 1 in (kit,lit). This
last assumption is not important to the main results of the paper but simpliﬁes the exposition.
Let φ > 0 be an outside option, common to all ﬁrms, expressed in units of the single good
concerning what each ﬁrm would get in an alternative project not considered explicitly in the
paper.2
In each period of time, ﬁrm i must decide between entering into the market to produce or not
entering. To take this decision, ﬁrms compare the after-tax proﬁts derived from production and
the yields of the alternative option. We make the following assumption about the taxes that a ﬁrm
faces:
2This outside option could be interpreted in the same spirit as in Jovanovic (1982) who considered it as a “man-
agerial ability” or “advantageous location” which is also common to all ﬁrms in that work.
4Assumption 1. The government taxes ﬁrms’ proﬁts at a rate τu
t but cannot tax the parameter φ.
This assumption implies that the tax system is incomplete and it is very important to our
results as it will become clear below; we analyze the consequences of dropping it in section 3.3. An
implication of this assumption is that we could also interpret φ as the return obtained by the ﬁrms
in an informal sector.
Firms’ proﬁts derived from production are given by the product obtained minus payments to
capital and labor. The rental rate of capital and the wage rate are determined in competitive
markets and are the same for all ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrms deciding to produce must obtain after-tax
proﬁts that are at least equal to φ. Hence, a ﬁrm solves the following static problem in period t:
max{φ ; Vit} (1)
where Vit = max
kit,lit
(1 − τu
t )[Aitf(kit,lit) − rtkit − wtlit] = max
kit,lit
(1 − τu
t )(1 − θ)Aitf(kit,lit),
the last term holds because of the homogeneity of the production function.
Let Vlt and Vut be the function Vit evaluated at the lowest and highest productivity shocks,
Ait = Al and Ait = Au, respectively.
Assumption 2. Vut > φ.
This assumption assures entrance of a positive mass of ﬁrms into production. The solution to
ﬁrms problem, equation (1), is stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a threshold technology level A∗ such that ﬁrms endowed with technology
Ait ≥ A∗
t enter into production, while ﬁrms endowed with Ait < A∗
t do not enter into production.
When Vlt ≤ φ, the threshold A∗




t )(1 − θ)A∗
tf(kit,lit) = φ. (2)
When Vlt > φ, the threshold A∗
t is equal to Al.
Proof. The function Vit in (1) is an increasing and continuous function of Ait.3 Then, when Vlt
3By the envelope theorem
∂Vit
∂Ait = (1 − τ
u
t )f(kit,lit).
5is smaller than φ, there is a unique Ait that makes Vit equal to φ given our assumption that Vut is
always higher than φ. If Vlt were larger than φ, all type of ﬁrms would prefer to produce and the
threshold A∗
t will be given by Al. 
Firms demand capital and labor if they participate in production, however these factors are not
needed if the ﬁrm is not engaged in production and participate in the alternative option. Thus,
factor demands are functions of factor prices and the idiosyncratic shock and are generically given
by:
kit = kit(Ait,rt,wt) if A∗
t ≤ Ait,
kit = 0 if A∗
t > Ait (3)
and
lit = lit(Ait,rt,wt) if A∗
t ≤ Ait
lit = 0 if A∗
t > Ait. (4)
Markets are competitive, capital and labor are paid their marginal productivity, and the rental

















where 1 − G(A∗
t) is the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production in period t.
The capital and labor demands for the economy follow from the aggregation of individual factor
demands by all the ﬁrms that decide to produce; that is, all the ﬁrms that get a productivity shock
higher than A∗
t. That is:
4Each ﬁrm equates its marginal productivity of capital and labor to the interest rate and the wage rate respectively,
that is, rt = Aitfk(kit,lit) and wt = Aitfl(kit,lit) . Equations (5) and (6) follow by aggregation of these expressions






















where u(.) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously diﬀerentiable in
both arguments. We assume also that uch ≥ 0. The household is endowed at time zero with an
initial amount of capital K0 and holds the initial stock of government bonds b0. Each period, she
decides how much to consume, how much to work, how much to invest in capital and government
bonds to be held into next period. It is assumed that capital depreciates at rate δ while total
time available to work and to rest is H. Capital, Kt, is rented to ﬁrms in order to be used in
the production process at the rental rate rt. Labor, Lt, is also rented to ﬁrms at the rate wt.




t VitdG(Ait), or alternatively, the returns of the outside option if ﬁrms do not engage
in production; which are, φG(A∗
t) . The government taxes the rental rate at rate τk
t , the wage rate
at the rate τl
t, ﬁrms’ proﬁts at rate τu
t and issue one period bonds, which pays a gross interest rate
of Rt. Let bd
t be the stock of bonds in hands of the representative household. Hence, each period
the household faces the following budget constraint:











Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + it (11)
ht + Lt = H (12)
7where following Chamley (1986) we deﬁne the variables ˜ rt and ˜ wt as ˜ rt ≡ rt(1 − τk
t ) and
˜ wt ≡ wt(1 − τl
t).
Note that the household’s problem does not include explicit expressions concerning uncertainty.
In fact, uncertainty in our model arises in the ﬁrm sector. While each ﬁrm faces an idiosyncratic
shock, there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy as the productivity parameter has the
same distribution each period.
The solution to the consumer’s problem yields the standard optimality conditions which include
the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption (13), the intratemporal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (14), the non-arbitrage condition (15) and
the transversality conditions for capital and government bonds.
Uc(t) = βUc(t + 1)(1 + e rt+1 − δ) (13)
Uh(t) = Uc(t)e wt (14)
Rt = 1 + e rt+1 − δ (15)
2.3 The government
As is usual in the optimal taxation literature the government collects taxes to ﬁnance an exogenous
expenditure path {gt}∞
t=0. We assume that the government expenditure is wasteful; that is it does
not provide any utility to the consumer. As noted above, the government ﬁnances its expenditure
by issuing bonds and levying ﬂat-rate, time-varying taxes on capital income, on labor income and
on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. To avoid the possibility that the government raises all revenues by taxing initial
capital heavily not distorting the economy allocations, we make the standard assumption that the
government takes the tax rate on capital income in the ﬁrst period, τk
0, as given. We also assume
that the government can commit itself to a given policy so we do not analyze commitment issues.
Further,
Assumption 3. We assume that τu < 1.
We consider the case where τu < 1 because when τu = 1 there would be no ﬁrms producing,
8making impossible to collect revenues to ﬁnance ﬁscal expenditure.5





















t ≥ gt ∀t
The ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the amount of taxes on labor income, the second is the
amount raised from capital income while the third term corresponds to the taxes raised from ﬁrms’
proﬁts. Since the ﬁrms’ production functions are homogeneous of degree θ and using the deﬁnitions
of (e wt,e rt), the government’s budget constraint can be written as (see appendix):
τu






















kitdG(Ait) ≥ gt ∀t (16)
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the description of our economy, we may state the following deﬁnition of equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {ct,kit,lit,bt}∞
t=0,i∈I, a se-
quence of prices {rt,wt,Rt}∞








1. the household maximizes (9) subject to (10), (11) and (12) taking as given K0 and b0,
2. each ﬁrm solves (1) conditional on Ait,
3. the sequence of threshold technology levels is determined by:
(1 − τu
t )(1 − θ)A∗
tf(k∗
t,l∗
t) ≥ φ ∀t,
where k∗
t,l∗
t are the optimal capital stock and labor demanded by the ﬁrm endowed with the
threshold technology level,
5In fact, when τ
u = 1 we have Vit = 0 < φ, ∀i
94. the government satisﬁes (16),






6. the labor market clears, i.e.









8. the good market clears






t) + (1 − δ)Kt ∀t (20)
3 The Ramsey Problem and the Optimal Taxes
Our goal is to characterize the tax rates that are consistent with the allocations in a second best
steady state, assuming that the economy converges to this steady state in the long run. As is
standard in the literature, the social planner will choose among the set of competitive equilibria
available the one that maximizes the representative individual utility. The planner chooses the
allocations, tax rates and threshold technologies subject to good market clearing, consumer bud-
get constraints, government budget constraints and individual’s and ﬁrms’ optimality conditions.
Therefore, the planner solves the following problem:
10L = max
{ct,τu























































1 + ˜ rt+1 − δ




t [uc(t) − βuc(t + 1)(1 + ˜ rt+1 − δ)] + λ4
t [uh(t) − uc(t) ˜ wt] + λ5
t [(1 − τu






Note that the above Ramsey problem is written as in the “dual approach”, similar to many
papers in the literature. In the problem, we followed Chamley (1986) by including ˜ rt and ˜ wt. Note
that these expressions do not represent prices but replace the capital income tax and the labor
income tax, respectively.
The ﬁrst constraint in this problem is the good market clearing, (20). The second one is the
government budget constraint (16) taking into account the non-arbitrage condition (15), while
the third one is the intertemporal consumption Euler equation (13). The fourth restriction is
the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (14). The last
restriction indicates that the marginal ﬁrm (i.e. the less productive one that decides to operate)
must earn after-tax proﬁts at least as large as the outside option in the alternative activity.6 For
expositional simplicity we post in the appendix the optimal conditions of the Ramsey problem.
3.1 Optimal capital income taxation
We will next state the planner’s optimal condition concerning capital stock in the ith ﬁrm, kit. The
optimality condition evaluated in steady state is:7
6We do not post the consumer budget constraint because it is redundant by Walras law.
7Follows from equation (53) in the appendix, dividing both sides by β








g(Ai) + λ2 [τu(1 − θ)Aifk(ki,li) + θAifk(ki,li) − e r]g(Ai)
+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗fk(k∗,l∗)1[Ai = A∗] = 0, (22)
where 1[Ai = A∗] equals to one if the ﬁrm i is the marginal one and is zero otherwise.
The ﬁrst term of this optimality condition indicates the marginal social value of the increase in
output derived from the marginal increase in capital by ﬁrm i net of investment cost. The second
term is the social valuation of the increase in tax revenues derived from the increase in capital;
while the last term indicates that if the ﬁrm is the marginal one, there is an additional consideration
that measures its incentive to enter into production.





Ai(1 − θ)f(ki,li)dG(Ai) = λ5A∗(1 − θ)f(k∗,l∗). (23)
This expression highlights the extensive margin distortion produced by a change in τu. It
balances the marginal social cost of raising τu, which is given by the social value of displacing the
marginal ﬁrm out of production –the term on the right hand side containing λ5–, with the social
value of raising government revenues trough the increase in this tax rate.
Integrating (22) with respect to all the ﬁrms involved in production and using (23) , we obtain
the following expression for τk (see appendix):
τk =















is the share of production (proﬁts) of the marginal ﬁrm in
total production (proﬁts). Note that SY is positive but less than one since the marginal ﬁrm has
a lower production (proﬁts) than the rest of the ﬁrms involved in production.
Equation (24) is not a reduced form expression for τk. In fact, it depends on other endogenous
12variables such as A∗, λ5
λ1+λ2 and SY . However, it allows us to obtain some intuition about the sign
of τk. Firstly, note that τk ≤ 0. This result holds because (1) τu < 1 -if not no ﬁrm would be
involved in production-, (2) λ1,λ2 and λ5 are non negative and (3) SY < 1.
The direct implication of setting τk less than zero is that the steady state rental rate faced by
ﬁrms, r, is depressed.8 This is in fact a capital income subsidy that provides incentives to ﬁrms
that are not producing, but in the neighborhood of doing so, to enter into production and allows
the government to obtain revenue from them using the tax on proﬁts. This would be the case if
τu > 0, a result that will be shown below.
Secondly, note that τk is zero when all ﬁrms are involved in production.9 In this case λ5 = 0
by complementary slackness. We can relate these results to the incompleteness of the tax system.
If some ﬁrms are not involved in production, it is impossible to obtain ﬁscal revenues from their
proﬁts and thus the tax system is incomplete. The planner reacts by setting a subsidy to production
costs, throughout a lower interest rate faced by ﬁrms, inducing some of them into production and
completing the tax system, at least partially. In the case that all ﬁrms are producing, the tax system
is complete and there is no further need to subsidize capital to induce ﬁrms into production.
Note that when there is no heterogeneity between ﬁrms, i.e. SY = 1, the optimal capital tax
rate is zero. However, this situation is considered in the above discussion since in this case all ﬁrms
would be producing; if all ﬁrms were in the alternative option there would not be taxation and the
analysis losses relevance.
We can summarize the ﬁndings of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. It is optimal to set τk less than zero if and only if not all ﬁrms are producing. In
the case that all ﬁrms are involved in production, the optimal τk is zero.
Proof. See the discussion above.
8By the consumer’s Euler condition, equation (13), in a steady state, we have:
1 = β(1 + r(1 − τ
k) − δ).
9An example where we would have this situation is when φ = 0 and Al > 0.
133.2 Optimal labor tax and optimal proﬁts’ tax
In this section, we focus on the labor and proﬁts’ tax chosen by the planner. As in the case of the
expression concerning τk, the expressions we obtain next are not reduced form solutions for those
taxes as they will depend on other endogenous variables. However, as above, we will be able to
obtain the signs and intuition about the economic determinants involved.
The optimal labor tax is obtained as follows. Similarly to the optimality condition of capital
stock, equation (22), we may obtain the optimality condition with respect to the allocation of labor
in the ith ﬁrm; which evaluated in steady state yields:10
[−uh + λ3uch(e r − δ) − λ4uhh + λ4uch e w]g(Ai)
+ λ1Aifl(ki,li)g(Ai) + λ2 [τu(1 − θ)Aifl(ki,li) + θAifl(ki,li) − e w]g(Ai)
+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)Aifl(k∗
i ,l∗
i)1[Ai = A∗] = 0, (25)
where, as before, 1[Ai = A∗] takes the value of one if the ﬁrm i is the marginal one and zero
otherwise.
The social planner balances the social beneﬁt of increasing output through a marginal increase
in labor (the term involving λ1), the social value of increasing tax revenues (the term involving
λ2) and the social value of the change in marginal ﬁrms’ proﬁts (the term involving λ5) with the
marginal social costs of increasing labor that is given by the direct eﬀect in the utility of the
consumer and the eﬀects in the marginal rates of substitution (ﬁrst term of (25)). Similar eﬀects
were present in the derivation of (22), with the exception of the last one.
Integrating this expression for all the ﬁrms involved in production and using the ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to ct , ˜ wt and ˜ rt in equations (55) to (57) in the appendix, we obtain (see
the appendix):
τl [λ2 (1 + σhh + σch) + uc] = λ2

(1 − θ)(1 − τu)
SY
(SY − 1) + (σhh + σcc + σch)

(26)
10Follows from dividing both sides of equation (54) in the appendix by β
t and dropping the time indexes since we
are in steady state.
14where σcc = −ucce c
uc , σch =
uche c
uh , σhh =
−uhh(1−h)








is total individual’s income -excluding ﬁrm’s transfers- in steady state.11 Note that σcc,σch,σhh > 0.
The term in parenthesis that multiplies τl is positive, so the sign of this tax depends on the sign
of the right hand side of (26). The ﬁrst term on the right hand side has similar components to the
expression obtained for τk in (24) and it is negative. The second term is the sum of σcc,σch and
σhh, which is related to the concavity of the utility function and is positive.
Equation (26) shows that there are two forces involved in the determination of the sign of the
optimal labor tax rate. On the one hand, and similar to the case of τk, there is an incentive to
subsidize ﬁrms’ production costs (the ﬁrst part of the right hand side on 26) to induce ﬁrms into
production, which allows to collect ﬁscal revenue from these additional ﬁrms by using the corporate
tax. On the other hand, there is a second term that considers the impact on the individual’s utility
of distorting leisure that shows that the more concave is the utility function, the more likely the
optimal labor tax to be positive.
Further, note that if the whole set of ﬁrms is involved in production λ5 = 0 and, from equation
(23), λ2 = 0. It follows from equation (26) that the optimal τl is zero, as in the case of capital
taxation. The intuition is that as the whole set of ﬁrms is already involved in production, the
planner’s incentives to subsidize ﬁrms’ costs disappear. Fiscal revenue will be obtained from ﬁrms’
proﬁts, as it will be shown below. As a result, the optimal policy is to set τl = 0 to avoid distortions
in the marginal rates of substitution.
We next focus in obtaining the optimal proﬁts’ tax τu. We will initially analyze the case in
which there are ﬁrms involved in production while others obtain φ in the alternative outside option.
In this case A∗ is interior, i.e. Al < A∗ < Au and λ5 > 0.
To obtain τu note that using equations (25) and the ﬁrst order condition with respect to A∗
(equation (58) in the appendix) yields (see the appendix):
11Also, note that
βbss = (1 + e r − δ)bss
is the gross return on bonds in steady state and
(1 − β)bss =
e r − δ





is the bonds’ interest payment expressed in units of this period.
15τu











Again, this expression is not a closed form solution since it depends on other endogenous
variables. However, it is enough to determine the sign of τu which is positive since the right hand
side of (27) is positive for the reasons mentioned above.
Let’s analyze next the case in which A∗ is not interior, i.e. Al = A∗. In this case equation (27)
cannot be applied in the analysis since it was obtained using the ﬁrst order condition with respect
to A∗, equation (58) in the appendix, that is no longer valid in the case that A∗ = Al. To obtain





(1 − θ)Aif(ki,li)dG(Ai) +
bss
1 + e r − δ
− bss = g
where bss are the level of government bonds in steady state. It follows:
τu =





Note that in the case where all ﬁrms are involved in production, the sign of τu depends on ﬁscal
expenditure, g, plus bond interest payments in steady state, (1 − β)bss. We can summarize the
preceding discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the case that some ﬁrms are not involved in production, the optimal tax on
proﬁts is positive while the sign of the optimal labor tax remains ambiguous. However, in the case
that all ﬁrms are involved in production, the optimal tax on proﬁts is diﬀerent from zero while the




163.3 Allowing Taxation on the Yields of the Alternative Option.
We have analyzed a set up where the planner faces a problem in which (1) there are heterogeneous
ﬁrms and (2) there is an alternative outside option to ﬁrms which return is not taxable. In this
setup, we have shown that τk ≤ 0 and τu > 0 while the sign of τl is ambiguous. We have also
shown that in the case that all ﬁrms choose to be involved in production, the optimal taxes are
τk = τl = 0 and τu 6= 0 .
We will argue next that these results depend crucially in the absence of taxation of the outside
option at the same rate as proﬁts derived from production. To understand the importance of this
assumption, we will allow next for taxation of φ at the same rate that is applied to proﬁts obtained
in production, τu. In that case, our Ramsey problem would be modiﬁed as follows:
L = max
{ct,τu
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t [uc(t) − βuc(t + 1)(1 + ˜ rt+1 − δ)] + µ4
t [uh(t) − uc(t) ˜ wt] + µ5
t(1 − τu






Problem (29) diﬀers from problem (21) in two ways. First, the government budget constraint
includes the taxation of the yields from the outside option, τu
t φG(A∗
t), and second, the marginal
ﬁrm’s entry decision diﬀers as a ﬁrm obtains a return (1 − τu
t )φ if it chooses not to participate in
production. We will next obtain the optimal taxes in this case. The next proposition states the
results.
Proposition 3. If we allow taxation of the outside option at the rate τu, the optimal tax rates are
τk = τl = 0 while τu 6= 0.
17Proof. We focus initially in the case of interior solution in A∗
t. The ﬁrst order condition with










= µ5 [(1 − θ)A∗
tf(k∗
t,l∗
t) − φ] (30)
Since in an interior solution (1−θ)A∗
tf(k∗
t,l∗
t) = φ it follows that µ2 = 0. Using this condition,
and the optimality condition with respect to capital stock, we obtain:
τk = −





On the other hand, using the optimality condition with respect to A∗, the optimality condition
on labor and the result concerning µ2, we get:
τk =












Note that (31) implies τk ≤ 0 while (32) implies τk ≥ 0. It follows that τk = 0. Further, the
optimality condition with respect to to labor implies:
τl (uc + µ2(1 + σhh + σch)) = µ2
(1 − θ)(1 − τu)
SY
[SY − 1] + µ2 [σhh + σcc + σch] (33)
But since µ2 = 0, it follows that (33) implies τl = 0. Finally, to satisfy the government budget
constraint we require:
τu =





where bss are the level of government bonds in steady state.
13We do not post in the appendix the derivations since they are similar to the ones obtained in the case where φ
is not taxable.
18We will now establish the results in the case of no interior solution, i.e. A∗ = Al. In this case
µ5 = 0 and by the optimality condition on τu, we have µ2 = 0. Trivially by (32) and (33), we
obtain τk = τl = 0 and by (34), we get τu 6= 0. 
Proposition 3 illustrates the importance of the impossibility of taxing ﬁrms’ outside option at
the same rate as proﬁts in our results: if we allow taxation of the proceeds of the alternative activity
at the same rate as proﬁts, capital income and labor taxes would be zero. In this case the tax on
proﬁts, τu, is non distortive since it does not aﬀect either the intensive or the extensive margins
because in both sectors there is a common tax rate.14
In the case that it is not possible to tax φ and not all ﬁrms are involved in production, the
corporate tax rate distorts the extensive margin and we obtain capital income and possibly labor
taxes less than zero. However, if all ﬁrms are involved in production, the tax on proﬁts is non
distortive and capital and labor taxes are zero.
These results indicate that the planner would use proﬁt taxation as the only source of tax
income when it is non distortive. However, when the tax on proﬁts is distortive because there are
ﬁrms in a non-taxable outside option, the planner has incentives to subsidize costs inducing ﬁrms
that are in the margin into production. In this way, the planner completes, at least partially, the
tax system.
4 Numerical Examples
We now use numerical methods to simulate calibrated versions of the model we have analyzed. We
will use these results to conﬁrm the validity of our analytical expressions and obtain additional




t (H − lt)1−Φ2Φ3
Φ3
(35)
In another hand, the production function of a ﬁrm operating:
14Note that if the tax on the alternative option, call it τ
φ, were diﬀerent from the tax on proﬁts a change in this
tax would aﬀect the extensive margin. However, our analysis of non taxation of the alternative option holds if we








In our simulations, we consider the long-run steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. To obtain
our results, we follow the procedure developed in Schmidt-Gohr´ e and Uribe (2006). In the notation
that follows, we eliminate the time index since we analyze the steady state. Let F(x,Γ) be the
ﬁrst order condition of the Ramsey problem deﬁned in (21), where x are the variables and Γ are
the parameters of the problem. Optimality requires F(x,Γ) = 0. Our goal is to obtain xss -where
ss indicates steady state- such that F(xss,Γ) = 0. To obtain the solution, we use the symbolic
Matlab toolbox and we follow the next algorithm:
1. Guess an initial candidate vector x
j
ss and choose criteria δ > 0,υ > 0, where j indicates
iteration.
2. Compute the direction sj to modify the initial candidate vector x
j
ss. The direction is chosen





ss,Γ) is the Jacobian of F(x,Γ) evaluated at x
j
ss and 0 indicates transpose.
3. Solve for the line-step criterion, λj, as in λj = argimλ F(x
j
ss + λsj,Γ).
4. Compute the update x
j+1









ss k < υ(1 + kx
j
ssk) continue to next step, otherwise go back to step 2.
6. If k∇F(x
j+1
ss ,Γ)k < δ(1 + kF(x
j+1
ss ,Γ)k) stop and report success, otherwise report failure.
15We alternatively used the Broyden-Fltecher-Goldfarb-Shannon method but we found no signiﬁcative diﬀerences
in our results.
20Calculation of the guess x
j
ss
To implement the numerical procedure, we require a candidate steady state vector in the jth
iteration, x
j
ss, which is calculated as follows. We discretize the number of ﬁrms and we include








ss). The rest of the variables
evaluated in the steady state are obtained by using the following algorithm in iteration j. Using





− (1 − δ) (37)








where N is the discrete number of total ﬁrms in the economy. Further, note that each ﬁrm’ s


























Note that equations (38) and (42) provide labor demand as function of the labor supply guess
and productivity parameters:




































ss i = 1,...,N (43)















We deﬁne next an indicator function equal to one when the ﬁrm decides to operate by using:







 ) + π/2)
π
(45)
where 1i(operation)j is the indicator function which is equal to one if the ith ﬁrm operates and





represent capital and labor demand if the ith ﬁrm operates. These demands are deﬁned in (43)
and (44). The parameter  determines shape of the function, the smaller is  the less smooth is the
function. An example of this function is shown in ﬁgure (1). It shows the case of a ﬁrm that faces
(τu = 0.1,φ = 1). In the ﬁgure we treat as exogenous capital and labor demand. Obviously in our
model, these two last variables are endogenous. However, in the ﬁgure we treat them as exogenous
to describe the way the function works out. In the ﬁgure, Ai ≈ 1.1 is a threshold level: if the
ﬁrm draws a productivity parameter larger than the threshold level, the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts are
larger than φ and the ﬁrm operates. Clearly, the smaller is  the more the function resembles an
indicator function.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
Note that if a ﬁrm does not operate, it does not demand either labor or capital. Therefore, we









i,ss 1i(operation)j = 1













i,ss 1i(operation)j = 1











































It follows that to satisfy the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, total labor supply is17:
lj










Equation (51) allows us to update our guess on labor supply. Let l
j,updated
ss be the update




ss k < ϑ, where ϑ > 0 is a convergence criterion, we have
computed the candidate vector x
j
ss. Otherwise, we go back to (37) and we recompute the steady
state variables in the jth iteration, using the updated labor supply.




17In this step, we require e w
j which is computed as:
e w




N (1 − τ
l,j
ss )
where N indicates the ﬁrm with the larger productivity parameter which by assumption (2) is always involved in
production.
23Parameters and results
We set the following parameters: β = 0.9906, δ = 0.05, α = 0.36, Φ2 = 0.75, Φ3 = 1,  = 10−100.
These parameters are consistent with the values reported Schmidt-Gohr´ e and Uribe (2006). We
discretize productivity in 50 equidistant points in the range [1,5], each of the points with 2%
probability. Hence, our numerical exercises will have 50 diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Figures (2) to (4) shows the results concerning after-tax proﬁts, labor demand and capital
demand per type of ﬁrm for θ = {0.7;0.85;0.9} and φ = 1.5. In the ﬁgures, when a ﬁrm’s after-tax
proﬁt equals to φ, the ﬁrm is not involved in production. As shown in the ﬁgures, optimal tax
rates diﬀer. In line with our theoretical discussion, we obtain in the three cases τu > 0,τk,τl < 0.
In general, the larger is θ the larger is τu and the larger are the subsidies to the capital and labor
income, τk and τl. Further, ﬁgure (2) shows also that the larger is θ, the larger is the fraction
of ﬁrms with after-tax proﬁts equal to φ, i.e. the larger is the fraction of ﬁrms not involved in
production. Figures (3) and (4) show respectively labor and capital demand per ﬁrm. The larger is
θ, the larger is the increase in labor and capital demand as productivity raises, conditional on the
ﬁrm being in operation. These result hold because the larger is θ, the more elastic is the marginal
cost of the ﬁrm and therefore the larger is the output and factor demands responses to the change
in productivity.
[Insert ﬁgures (2) to (4) about here]
Table (1) shows the results for diﬀerent values of φ. The ﬁrst three columns of the table present
the ﬁrm’s exogenous parameters, the next three columns show the preference parameters and the
last four columns show the results, including the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production, 1−G(A∗).
In the table, ﬁscal expenditure is set at a level of 500, which corresponds to 7% of output when
(φ = 0,g = 0), i.e. the case in which all ﬁrms are involved in production and there are no ﬁscal
distortions.
The table shows that, conditional on φ, a larger θ in most of the cases is associated with larger
corporate tax rate and larger capital and labor subsidy. Similarly, the fraction of ﬁrms involved in
production decreases. These results are in line with the results obtained in ﬁgures (2) to (4) but as
shown in the table, they also apply to the cases of φ = {1;1.5;2}. Intuitively, the larger is θ, holding
constant other parameters, the lower are ﬁrms’ proﬁts and the larger must be the corporate tax rate
24to raise revenues. In another hand, larger subsidies to production cost are required to complete the
tax system, i.e. provide incentive to ﬁrms to produce, the larger is θ. Finally, the result concerning
a lower fraction of ﬁrms involved in production is easily explained because a larger θ is associated
with larger factor payments and lower after-tax pure ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
[Insert table (1) about here]
Table (2) provides sensibility analysis. In the table we use as benchmark the cases: (φ,θ) =
(1,0.85) and (φ,θ) = (1,0.9). We initially include in the table a larger ﬁscal expenditure. We set
ﬁscal expenditure at 600 which corresponds approximately to 8.5% of output when all ﬁrms are
involved in production and there are no ﬁscal distortions. While the signs of the tax rates continue
to be τu > 0,τk,τl < 0, there is not a unique response of the taxes rates to the increase in ﬁscal
expenditure. In one hand when θ = 0.85, the magnitudes of both the subsidies and the corporate
tax rate decrease and as a result, the fraction of ﬁrms become larger. In that case, the base of
collection, in terms of the number of ﬁrms, increases. In another hand when θ = 0.9, the corporate
tax rate marginally increases while the labor tax rate becomes larger and the capital income tax
rate approaches zero. In this case, the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production remained stable
while the increase in labor subsidy is small compared to the decrease in capital income tax rate,
i.e. the increase in tax revenues is obtained holding constant the base of the tax collection and
decreasing net subsidies.
We next set α = 0.4, i.e. we increase the capital share in the production function. In this
case, the optimal subsidy in capital income becomes larger, both in the case of θ = {0.85;0.9}
while the labor subsidy and the corporate tax rate approach to zero. As a result, the number of
ﬁrms involved in production is larger. In this case, the ﬁrm’s capital demand becomes more elastic
providing more incentives to the planner to depress the rate of return faced by ﬁrms to induce more
ﬁrms into production. Since the number of ﬁrms involved in production -which is a component of
the tax base- raises, the planner might depress the labor subsidy and the corporate tax rate.
Finally, we provide a sensibility analysis of the response of optimal tax rates vis-` a-vis the
parameters of the utility function, (Φ2,Φ3). In one hand, when we increase Φ2, the triplet of
taxes approaches zero while the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production increases. In this case,
distortions in leisure are more relevant, and the planner reacts by setting a smaller subsidy to labor
25income. To satisfy the government budget constraint the planner reacts by providing incentives
to new ﬁrms to enter into production by setting lower distortions -through lower corporate tax
rate- in the extensive margin decision. In another hand, when we set Φ3 = 0.75, i.e. the utility
function becomes more concave, we obtain mix results. In the case of θ = 0.85, the capital income
subsidy approaches zero while the magnitude of the labor income subsidy and the magnitude of the
corporate tax rate increase and subsequently the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production decreases.
When θ = 0.9, the contrary holds. The consequence of this last set of results is that the planner
uses the optimal tax rates such that ﬂuctuations in the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production is
diminished, as a way of decreasing ﬂuctuations in consumption and labor supply (leisure).
[Insert table (2) about here]
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced heterogeneous ﬁrms to study optimal taxation. Firms diﬀer in
their productivity and have to decide if they want to produce in each period after comparing their
expected proﬁts vis-` a-vis an outside option that is not taxable, i.e. our environment is one of
incomplete taxation (Correia (1996)). To ﬁnance its expenditure the government relies on capital
income, labor and proﬁts taxation. The presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms implies two kind of possible
distortions from taxes. They may aﬀect the extensive margin decisions (i.e. whether to produce or
not) and the intensive margin decisions (i.e. optimal allocation given that they decide to produce).
We have shown that the results depend on whether all ﬁrms decide to produce or the less
productive ﬁrms decide not to produce. In the ﬁrst case, there is no distortion in the extensive
margin and the social planner will not tax capital, which replicates Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985) results of not taxing capital income in the long run. Also, in this case, it is optimal not to
tax labor and leaving the tax on proﬁts as the only source of ﬁscal revenues.
However, when there are ﬁrms that are not so productive or when the outside option is high
enough such that some ﬁrms prefer not to produce, it is optimal to subsidize capital. The sign of
the tax on labor income is ambiguous depending on the distortions that creates in the labor supply.
The intuition of the subsidy is related to the government’s impossibility to tax the ﬁrms’ alter-
native option. By subsidizing production costs, the government induce ﬁrms to produce making
26possible to tax them through their proﬁts. That is, in the second best, the planner is partially
completing the tax instruments by taxing ﬁrms that they would not be taxed if they remain in the
alternative option. In this respect, ﬁrm heterogeneity is key to the results.
We have also analyzed the case when the government can tax the yields from the alternative
option at the same rate that taxes proﬁts from ﬁrms that are involved in production. In this case
the tax system is complete and there is no need to induce ﬁrms into production by subsidizing.
Tax on proﬁts are now non distortive and it is optimal to set tax on capital and labor income equal
to zero.
27Appendix
•Derivation of equation 16











































































t ≥ gt ∀t (52)
Finally, since wtlit + rtkit = θAitf(kit,lit), we get equation (16) in the text.
28•Optimality conditions of Ramsey problem in equation (21).
The optimality condition with respect to kit is:
λ1tβt [Aitfk(kit,lit) + (1 − δ)]g(Ait) + λ2tβt [τu
t (1 − θ)Aitfk(kit,lit) + θAitfk(kit,lit) − e rt]g(Ait)
+ λ5tβt(1 − τu




t] = βt−1 (53)
The optimality condition with respect to lit is:
βt [−uh(t) + λ3tuch(t)(e rt − δ) − λ4tuhh(t) + λ4tuch(t)e wt]g(Ait)
+ βtλ1tAitfl(kit,lit)g(Ait) + βtλ2t [τu
t (1 − θ)Aitfl(kit,lit) + θAitfl(kit,lit) − e wt]g(Ait)
+ βtλ5t(1 − τu




t] = 0 (54)
The optimality condition with respect to (ct,A∗
t,f wt,e rt) evaluated in steady state are:
[c] : uc(c,h) − λ1 + ucc(c,h)[λ3(−e r + δ) − λ4 e w] = 0 (55)
[e w] : −λ2
Z Au
A∗
lidG(At) − λ4uc(c,h) = 0 (56)





1 + e r − δ
− λ3uc(c,h) = 0 (57)
[A∗] : [uh − λ3uch(e r − δ) − λ4uch e w + λ4uhh]l∗g(A∗) + λ1 [−1 + (1 − τu)(1 − θ)]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) +
+λ1e rk∗g(A∗) + λ2 [−τu(1 − θ) − θ]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) + λ2 [e rk∗ + e wl∗]g(A∗)
+λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)f(k∗,l∗) = 0 (58)
29•Derivation of equation (24):
























Aifk(ki,li)dG(Ai) − e r(1 − G(A∗
t))
#
+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗fk(k∗,l∗) = 0 (59)
Adding and substracting λ2
R Au
A∗






































(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗fk(k∗,l∗) = 0 (60)
Since β(1 + e rt − δ) = 1 and using (5):




(1 − τu)(1 − θ)r = 0 (61)
Dividing by r:




(1 − τu)(1 − θ) = 0 (62)










[SY − 1] (63)
30Where (63) is equation (24) in the text.
•Derivation of equation (26):
Integrating (25) with respect to the ﬁrms involved in production, we have:












Aifl(ki,li)dG(Ai) − e w(1 − G(A∗))

+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗fl(k∗,l∗) = 0 (64)
Adding and substracting λ2
R Au
A∗
t Aifl(ki,li)g(Ai) and dividing by 1 − G(A∗), we obtain:





















(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗fl(k∗,l∗) = 0 (65)
Using (6):
[uh − λ3uch(e r − δ) + λ4uhh − λ4uch e w]
= λ1w + λ2 [(τu − 1)(1 − θ)w] + λ2wτl +
λ5
1 − G(A∗)
(1 − τu)(1 − θ)w (66)
31It follows that:
τl =











(1 − τu)(1 − θ)(67)
Using (23) in (67):
τl =










(1 − τu)(1 − θ) (68)
Note that using (55) to (58):
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Since uc e w = uh, we have:
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Further β(1 + e rt − δ) = 1 implies b
1+e r−δ = bβ. Let σcc = −ucce c
uc , σch =
uche c
uh , σ(h) =
−uhh(1−h)
uh








is total individual’s income -excluding ﬁrm’s
32transfers- in steady state. It follows:







+ σcc + σch(1 − τl) + σhh(1 − τl)(70)
Replacing (70) in (68):
τl = −τluc
λ2











+ σch + σhh






(1 − τu)(1 − θ) (71)
This is equation (26) in the text.
•Derivation of equation (27):
Replacing (66) in (58):
λ1wl∗g(A∗) + λ2 [(τu − 1)(1 − θ)wl∗g(A∗)] + λ2wτll∗g(A∗) +
λ5
1 − G(A∗)
(1 − τu)(1 − θ)wl∗g(A∗)
+ λ1 [−1 + (1 − τu)(1 − θ)]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) + λ1e rk∗g(A∗)
+ λ2 [−τu(1 − θ) − θ]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) + λ2 [e rk∗ + e wl∗]g(A∗) + λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)f(k∗,l∗) = 0 (72)
Using e r = r(1 − τk) and additional steps of algebra:
(λ1 + λ2)[wl∗ + rk∗]g(A∗) + λ2 [(τu − 1)(1 − θ)wl∗g(A∗)]
+ (λ1 + λ2)[−1 + (1 − τu)(1 − θ)]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) − (λ1 + λ2)rτkk∗g(A∗)
+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)f(k∗,l∗) +
λ5
1 − G(A∗)
(1 − τu)(1 − θ)wl∗g(A∗) = 0 (73)
33It follows:






[(1 − τu)(1 − θ)wl∗g(A∗)]
+ (λ1 + λ2)[−1 + (1 − τu)(1 − θ)]A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) −
λ5
1 − G(A∗)
(1 − τu)(1 − θ)(SY − 1)rk∗g(A∗)
+ λ5(1 − τu)(1 − θ)f(k∗,l∗) = 0
Since (23) implies λ2 = λ5
1−G(A∗)SY , we have:
−(λ1 + λ2)τu(1 − θ)A∗f(k∗,l∗)g(A∗) +
λ5
1 − G(A∗)




(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗f(k∗,l∗) = 0
Dividing by (λ1 + λ2)(1 − τu)(1 − θ)A∗f(k∗,l∗), we ﬁnally obtain:
τu











which is (27) in the text.
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36Figure 2: Steady state after-tax proﬁts per ﬁrm
37Figure 3: Steady state labor demand per ﬁrm
38Figure 4: Steady state capital demand per ﬁrm
39Table 1: Optimal policies in steady state
φ θ α Φ2 Φ3 g 1 − G(A∗) τk τl τu
1 0.7 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.66 -0.0358 0.0021 0.0166
1 0.75 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.60 -0.233 -0.1563 0.183
1 0.8 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.54 -0.3294 -0.0655 0.1561
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.44 -0.3935 -0.2635 0.2812
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.30 -0.3816 -1.0553 0.5319
1.5 0.7 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.60 -0.0731 -0.0041 0.0492
1.5 0.8 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.48 -0.2945 -0.0616 0.1484
1.5 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.40 -0.399 -0.0855 0.2109
1.5 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.30 -0.4242 -0.3199 0.2822
2 0.7 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.54 -0.0878 0.0188 0.0679
2 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.36 -0.2483 -0.5221 0.2147
2 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.28 -0.3197 -0.0866 0.1728
40Table 2: Optimal policies in steady state, sensibility analysis
φ θ α Φ2 Φ3 g 1 − G(A∗) τk τl τu
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.44 -0.3935 -0.2635 0.2812
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.30 -0.3816 -1.0553 0.5319
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 600 0.46 -0.0109 -0.0514 0.0219
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 600 0.30 -0.2141 -1.1232 0.565
1 0.85 0.4 0.75 1 500 0.48 -0.4368 -0.1017 0.2317
1 0.9 0.4 0.75 1 500 0.36 -0.3923 -0.2923 0.3191
1 0.85 0.36 0.85 1 500 0.46 -0.2905 -0.0546 0.1434
1 0.9 0.36 0.85 1 500 0.34 -0.3349 -0.2621 0.2708
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 0.75 500 0.40 -0.1416 -2.5552 0.4611
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 0.75 500 0.34 -0.4456 -0.2417 0.2637
41